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Comment
Jumping on the Ban Wagon: Minetos v. City University
of New York and the Future of the Peremptory
Challenge
Patricia J. Griffin*
Fior D'Aliza Minetos worked as an office assistant in the
Music Department of Hunter College.' After ten years, she left
her job when the College transferred her against her will.2 Mi-
netos filed suit against City University of New York, Hunter
College, and several music department professors, alleging na-
tional origin, accent, and age discrimination.3 During trial jury
selection, the defense used three of its four peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude one Hispanic and two African American pro-
spective jurors.' Minetos objected, arguing that these peremp-
tory challenges were racially motivated,5 in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.' The trial court agreed,7 stating that
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1995,
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse; B.S.N. 1985, Viterbo College.
1. Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2. Id.; see also Minetos v. City University of New York, 875 F. Supp.
1046, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (providing more details regarding the facts and
denying defendanefs motion for summary judgment). Minetos attempted to
prove that her resignation was a "constructive discharge," which occurs when
employers make working conditions so intolerable a reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position would resign. 925 F. Supp. at 186.
3. 925 F. Supp. at 179. Minetos claimed national origin and accent dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and age discrimi-
nation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. Addi-
tionally, Minetos alleged tortious interference with contract, a state law claim
against the music professors. Id.
5. Id. at 180.5. Id. at 179-80.
6. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
7. Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 182. The court applied the three-step Batson
test. Id. at 181. Minetos established a prima facie showing raising an infer-
ence that the defense used peremptory challenges in a race-based manner.
Id. The defense claimed that the jurors were struck for various non-
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Minetos would be entitled to a new trial if the jury returned a
verdict in the defense's favor.8 Upon a jury verdict for the de-
fendants, 9 however, the trial court denied Minetos a new trial'0
based on its finding that Minetos also used peremptory chal-
lenges in a racially discriminatory manner by striking only
white male prospective jurors." In addition to denying Mine-
tos a new trial on the basis of the discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges, 2 the court used the case as an opportunity
to hold that peremptory challenges in general should be
banned because they inherently violate equal protection. 3
Minetos is the first judicial decision to analyze the efficacy
of the three-part test devised by the Supreme Court 4 for de-
termining whether peremptory challenges are motivated by
racial discrimination.' More significantly, the Minetos court's
holding that peremptory challenges per se violate the Equal
Protection Clause 6 is unprecedented. In demanding elimina-
tion of peremptory challenges, the court's decision calls for
other courts to reexamine the discriminatory implications of
the peremptory challenge and join in the call for its abolition."'
discriminatory reasons. Id. at 181-82. One potential juror was a substitute
teacher in the same school system Minetos worked for after leaving Hunter
College. Id. at 181. Another stated he did not feel speaking English was
"necessarily needed" on the job. Id. The third juror was a "blue collar worker"
the defense believed might not "understand[]... office dynamics." Id. at 182.
The court noted a pattern of striking exclusively minority jurors and found
that the proffered explanations were pretext for discrimination. Id. Ulti-
mately, only one minority person, a Hispanic woman, sat on the Minetos jury.
Id. at 180.
8. Id.
9. The jury returned a verdict for the defense on the Title VII and ADEA
claims. Id. The court entered judgment as a matter of law on the state claim
of tortious interference with contract. Id. Minetos moved for a new trial on
all of her claims, or, in the alternative, the state law claims. Id.
10. Id. at 185.
11. Id. at 182. Minetos explained that the white male jurors were per-
ceived as "pro-management." Id. The court determined that, because the
New York business community is overwhelmingly white, this explanation was
pretextual. Id.
12. Id. at 185.
13. Id.
14. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (outlining the three-
step test for determining whether peremptory challenges are racially dis-
criminatory and therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause); see also infra
notes 70-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Batson three-step test).
15. Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 181-85.
16. Id. at 185.
17. Id.
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This Comment contends that future courts should join the
Minetos clarion call for a ban on peremptory challenges. Part I
traces the history of jury composition jurisprudence and out-
lines the current state of the law. Part H discusses the Minetos
court's holding and reasoning. Part III argues that the Minetos
holding is more consistent with the intent underlying the Su-
preme Court's peremptory challenge cases than is the current
Batson test. Part I further argues that while Minetos's de-
termination that Batson provides ineffective protection for liti-
gants, prospective jurors, and the community rests on sound
evidence, the court's analysis fails to support its groundbreak-
ing conclusion. This Comment concludes that elimination of
the peremptory challenge will end the frustration and confu-
sion plaguing lower courts as well as provide the best protec-
tion for prospective jurors, litigants, and the community.
I. THE ISSUE OF RACE IN JURY COMPOSITION
JURISPRUDENCE
A. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF JURY SELECTION AND
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Jury selection is a two-part process." First, the state se-
lects a pool of potential jurors from the community' 9 and calls
them to appear for jury service, 20 making up the jury venire.2 1
18. Anna M. Scruggs, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Strike Two for
the Peremptory Challenge, 26 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 549, 551 (1995); see also Bar-
bara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Serv-
ice, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1143-44 (1993) (discussing the jury selection
process); James H. Coleman, Jr., The Evolution of Race in the Jury Selection
Process, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1996) (discussing the jury selection
process in the state court context); Barbara L. Horwitz, Comment, The Extinc-
tion of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury System Lose by Its De-
mise?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1391, 1401-02 (1993) (discussing the jury selection
process).
19. States utilize various statutorily derived processes for selecting thejury venire. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 18, at 1115-16 (outlining the New
Jersey process for jury selection).
20. Id.
21. Scruggs, supra note 18, at 551. The Sixth Amendment states, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantee of an im-
partial jury requires a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (stating the Sixth Amendment requires a jury drawn
from a "source fairly representative of the community"); Peters v. Kiff, 407
1997] 1239
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Not all of these potential jurors eventually serve, however.22
During the second step, the judge and the attorneys question
the jury venire in the process of voir dire to determine the exis-
tence of biases and suitability for jury service.23 The remaining
jurors comprise the petit jury, which actually hears and de-
cides the case.24
During voir dire, an attorney can exclude a juror from the
petit jury either for cause or by exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge.25 Peremptory challenges allow an attorney to strike a
potential juror without designating a cause for removal,26 while
a challenge for cause requires an attorney to state the reasons
why a juror should not be seated, such as bias. Originally
transplanted from England into American common law,28 the
peremptory challenge has become an integral part of the
American justice system.29 Commentators, attorneys, and
U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (stating that the Sixth Amendment comprehends a fair
possibility of obtaining a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (explaining that a jury
will be able to complete its functions as long as it is drawn from a fair cross
section of the community); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)(holding a six-person jury constitutional as long as it is drawn from a fair
cross section of the community).
22. See Scruggs, supra note 18, at 551 (indicating how potential jurors are
removed).
23. Id.
24. Coleman, supra note 18, at 1116; Scruggs, supra note 18, at 552.
25. Coleman, supra note 18, at 1116; Scruggs, supra note 18, at 551.
26. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). Traditionally, the per-
emptory challenge's "essential nature" requires it be exercised without reason,
inquiry, or court control. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894);
see also Horwitz, supra note 18, at 1392-93 (discussing the nature and pur-
pose of the peremptory challenge).
27. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY, supra note 26, at 856.
28. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (noting that the British Crown initially had an unlimited number of
challenges); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be
Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369, 371-74 (reviewing the history of the peremp-
tory challenge in England); Horwitz, supra note 18, at 1396 (reviewing the
history of peremptory challenges); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious
Legacy: Discriminatory Jury Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 339 (1993) (reviewing the history of the per-
emptory challenge). Although peremptory challenges were conferred by stat-
ute in England, American courts initially accepted the defendants peremptory
challenges as part of the common law. Broderick, supra, at 374. The prose-
cution's peremptory challenges were conferred by federal and state statute.
Id. at 374-75.
29. See Broderick, supra note 28, at 371-78 (reviewing the history of the
peremptory challenge and analyzing its role in the American judicial system
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Horwitz, supra note 18, at
1240 [Vol. 81:1237
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judges argue that peremptory challenges ensure an impartial
jury30 by allowing attorneys on both sides to exclude jurors be-
1397-98 (reviewing the history and role of peremptory challenges in the
American judicial system); Swift, supra note 28, at 340 (same).
30. Babcock, supra note 18, at 1143. The Supreme Court has stated that
the sole function of the peremptory challenge is assisting the government in
selecting an impartial jury. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 620 (1991).
One difficulty in abolishing the peremptory challenge in criminal trials
may be the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, which presupposes
the right to remove partial influences. Horwitz, supra note 18, at 1395.
"[The] right to strike jurors [a party] perceives as unable to try his case solely
on the evidence is among the most important of the means designed to ensure
him an impartial jury." Id. The peremptory challenge process, in which both
sides seek to strike those jurors perceived as biased, which the other side
likely views as ideal, results in an impartial jury. Judith H. Germano, Note,
Preserving Peremptories: A Practitioner's Prerogative, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 431, 436-37 (1995). This makes the peremptory challenge vital to
the formation of an impartial jury. Id. Justice Scalia also argues that the
peremptory challenge may be compelled by the Sixth Amendment. See Hol-
land v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1990) ("One could plausibly argue...
that the requirement of an 'impartial jury' impliedly compels peremptory
challenges, but in no way could it be interpreted directly or indirectly to pro-
hibit them.").
Others argue the Sixth Amendment does not require peremptory chal-
lenges and, in fact, peremptory challenges may prevent the formation of an
impartial jury. See id. at 482 (noting that in Stilson v. United States, 250
U.S. 583, 586 (1919), the Court stated that peremptory challenges are not
compelled by the Sixth Amendment); Broderick, supra note 28, at 407
("Rather than promote fair trials, there is every reason to conclude that the
peremptory undermines them."); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Dis-
crimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
725, 731 (1992) (noting that the argument that peremptory challenges allow
formation of impartial juries necessarily attributes views and biases to jurors
on the basis of race). For example, to claim that removing all blacks from a
jury will prevent their bias in favor of the black defendant from having an im-
pact on the verdict necessarily requires attributing racial bias against that
defendant to the remaining white jurors. Id. at 730. The right of an accused
to be tried by a jury selected in a nondiscriminatory manner is irreconcilable
with the "peremptory challenge which serves to effectuate every conceivable
discriminatory classification." Broderick, supra note 28, at 407. Broderick
also argues that empirical studies show that impartial juries and peremptory
challenges are inconsistent. Id. at 413. He points to an English survey
showing a seven percent increase in conviction rates when defense attorneys
exercise peremptories. Id. Another study indicated that there is "little bene-
fit" to gain through the use of peremptory challenges because erratic perform-
ance by attorneys indicate that counsel is unable to identify prejudiced jurors.
Id. Melilli argues that the value of the jury system lies in its representation
of various group beliefs, which then diminish the impact of unfair biases.
Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What Have We Learned About Batson
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 500 (1996). The
peremptory challenge distorts the formation of the impartial jury because it
allows removal of some of these group beliefs. Id.; see also supra note 21 and
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longing to groups they believe would favor the other side,31
particularly when the attorney believes that the voir dire proc-
ess failed to uncover potential juror biases.3 2 Other commenta-
tors contend, however, that such challenges instead ensure a
partial jury because attorneys try to select jurors favoring their
own client while attempting to exclude those believed to favor
the other side.33 Indeed, many commentators have noted that
the arbitrary nature of peremptory challenges increases the po-
tential for abuse, including the use of peremptory challenges to
mask discrimination.
34
B. CASE LAW: A Focus ON JURY COMPOSITION
The Supreme Court's jury composition cases focus on the
impact of invidious discrimination on the criminal defendant,
the juror, and the community. The Court sought to protect the
accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Amendment fair cross section re-
quirement).
It may be argued that the Sixth Amendment fair cross section cases and
the equal protection cases are irreconcilable. The equal protection peremp-
tory challenge cases "reject race or gender stereotyping," while the "fair cross
section cases are riddled with [the very] assumptions and stereotypes" the
equal protection cases reject. Scruggs, supra note 18, at 572. The Batson
three-step test for peremptory challenges focuses on equal protection con-
cerns. Id. at 572-73. However, in its Sixth Amendment analysis of the per-
emptory challenge issue, the Court reiterated that only a representative ve-
nire is required. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478. The necessary presumption of
Holland that certain groups "may be partial to a certain class of individuals"
is a "nagging discrepanc[y." Scruggs, supra note 18, at 576.
31. See Germano, supra note 30, at 431 (noting that attorneys use per-
emptory challenges to remove jurors they perceive as favoring their oppo-
nent).
32. Babcock, supra note 18, at 1146.
33. See Germano, supra note 30, at 431 (quoting JOAN M. BROVINS &
THOMAS OEHMKE, THE TRIAL PRACTICE GUIDE: STRATEGIES, SYSTEMS, AND
PROCEDURES FOR THE ATTORNEY 80 (1992) as stating, "In your eyes, jurors
should be biased in favor of your client. .. ."); see also id. at 436 (noting that
attorneys "prefer jurors who are partial toward their case's theory"); Melilli,
supra note 30, at 453 ("In the exercise of peremptory challenges, the lawyers,
of course, seek not an impartial jury, but rather jurors most favorable to their
client's interests.").
34. See Broderick, supra note 28, at 370 ("The peremptory challenge is
habitually employed to discriminate against citizens on the basis of invidious
and atavistic classifications."); Jonathan Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Chal-
lenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REv.
1026, 1026 (1987) ("[C]ouched within the traditions of... selection techniques
lie intractable patterns of invidious discrimination."); Swift, supra note 28, at
337 (noting the Courfs acknowledgment of the peremptory challenge's poten-
tial to mask discrimination in the courtroom).
[Vol. 81:12371242
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right of any criminal defendant to be tried by a jury chosen in a
nondiscriminatory manner.35 It further sought vindication and
protection of the prospective juror's right to serve36 because the
constitutional right to serve on a jury provides one of the pri-
mary means of citizen participation in a democratic society.37
State violation of these rights perpetuates discrimination by
perpetuating racial prejudice. 38 The right of a prospective juror
and criminal defendant not to be subjected to invidious dis-
crimination is thus central to the antidiscrimination jurispru-
dence of the Court when dealing with the issue of jury compo-
sition and selection.
39
35. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) (noting that
denying an African American the right to a jury chosen without racial dis-
crimination while providing that right to white defendants violates equal pro-
tection).
36. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427-28 (1994)
(noting that all members of the community called for jury service have the
right not to be subjected to discrimination); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,
49 (1992) (noting that discriminatory peremptory challenges expose the juror
to open and public discrimination); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 618-19 (1991) (noting that the juror in the civil context is no less
harmed by discriminatory jury selection); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-
10 (1991) (noting a potential juror has the right not to be excluded on the ba-
sis of race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (noting that a person's
race has no impact on fitness to serve as a juror); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (discussing the harms of allowing discriminatory ju-
ror exclusion); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)
("Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable seg-
ments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the con-
stitutional concept of jury trial.").
37. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 407 (noting that, other than voting, jury
service provides the best opportunity for citizens to participate in democratic
government); Keith A. Ward, Comment, The Only Thing in the Middle of the
Road Is a Dead Skunk and a Yellow Stripe: Peremptory Challenges-Take 'Em
or Leave 'Em, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1361, 1361-62 (1995) (discussing the im-
portance of the American jury system as a vehicle for citizen participation in
democratic government).
38. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
39. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88 (noting the dangers of racially discrimi-
natory jury selection extend beyond the defendant and juror to the entire
community); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28 (discussing the importance
of protecting potential jurors from discriminatory jury selection techniques);
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48-50 (discussing the importance of eliminating dis-
criminatory jury selection practices); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19 (discussing
the need to protect potential jurors from discrimination); Powers, 499 U.S. at
409-10 (noting the importance of jury service as a reason for eliminating dis-
crimination injury selection).
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1. Strauder v. West Virginia: Equal Protection in Jury
Composition
The Supreme Court first addressed concerns about racially
discriminatory jury selection processes in the years following
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Strauder v.
West Virginia," the Court held that enforcement of a statute
excluding African Americans from jury service41 denied equal
protection to an African American defendant because the jury
pool selection process discriminated on the basis of race.42 The
Court also concluded that denying African Americans the right
to serve on a jury violated the equal protection rights of the po-
tential jurors.43 The Strauder Court believed that to deny the
African American citizen the right to participate as a juror on
the basis of race branded him inferior and encouraged racial
prejudice." The Court stressed that the composition of the se-
lected jury is an "essential part" of the right to trial by jury.45
The Court further reasoned that if a white man is entitled to a
jury chosen without discrimination as to race, denial of the
same right to a black criminal defendant is clearly a violation
of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.46
After Strauder, criminal defendants continued to challenge
discriminatory jury selection practices,4' including the poten-
40. Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
41. Id. at 310. The statute at issue specifically stated that only white
males were allowed to serve on juries. Id. at 304. Strauder was indicted and
tried by all-white juries. Id. He argued that he could not receive the full
benefit of the law if tried by an all-white jury. Ward, supra note 37, at 1364.
The trial court overruled his motions for a new venire, new petit jury, and
new trial, all of which he based on his constitutional challenge to the West
Virginia statute. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304-05.
42. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
43. Id. at 308.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 309.
47. Many -of the cases after Strauder focused on the Sixth Amendment
Impartial Jury Clause. See cases cited supra note 21 (discussing the Sixth
Amendment fair cross section of the community standard). During these
years, however, the Court did not ignore equal protection analysis. Particu-
larly after 1935, the Court examined the jury venire for equal protection vio-
lations. The Court rejected state officials' claims that there were no suitable
blacks available for jury service as an explanation for why no blacks had
served on a grand or petit jury "in the history of the county." Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587, 591-97 (1935). The unwillingness of the Court to accept
"without question the self-serving statements by officials that racial discrimi-
nation was not responsible for the total elimination of blacks from the venire"
1244 [Vol. 81:1237
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tially discriminatory nature of the peremptory challenge and
the effect of its use on jury composition. 48 Following suit, the
Supreme Court turned to the doctrinal underpinnings of
Strauder to analyze discriminatory jury selection processes in
the context of the peremptory challenge.49
2. Swain v. Alabama: Equal Protection and the Peremptory
Challenge
Although Supreme Court cases such as Strauder prohib-
ited states from excluding African Americans from jury pools,
states still allowed racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude African Americans from petit juries.50  De-
spite the increasing federalization of civil rights and liberties
throughout the 1960s,51 the Supreme Court refused to expand
federal equal protection to prohibit racially discriminatory per-
emptory challenges in state courts.5 2 In Swain v. Alabama,53
the Court hailed the "old credentials" of the peremptory chal-
lenge,54 including its function in ensuring impartial juries, 55
and characterized the peremptory challenge as an "essential"
feature of the justice system. 6 The Court found that, in general,
peremptory challenges exercised to remove minority veniremen
in a particular case do not violate equal protection as long as
selection of the jury pool itself is nondiscriminatory. 57 Accord-
ing to the Court, because all veniremen are subject to removal
without cause, they receive equal treatment during the petit
was an important step forward. Broderick, supra note 28, at 384. As the
Court became more vocal in preventing the exclusion of blacks from the ve-
nire, peremptories became the tool of choice for removing them from the petit
jury. Id. at 385.
48. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 216 n.19 (1965), overruled by Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. See Coleman, supra note 18, at 1120 (discussing Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Court reiterated that "purposeful or delib-
erate denial" of the right to jury service to blacks violates equal protection.
Id. at 203-04.
54. Id. at 212-19.
55. Id. at 219.
56. Id. at 219-20.
57. Id. at 220-21.
1997] 1245
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jury selection process.58 Yet, the Court did not reject the notion
that peremptory challenges might violate equal protection in
practice.5 9 The Court allowed the criminal defendant to over-
come a presumption 60 that the prosecution used its peremptory
challenges to achieve a fair and impartial jury by proving
"systematic" discriminatory abuse of peremptory challenges
over a period of time,61 which required a defendant to gather
evidence from outside the scope of his own trial. 2
The Swain decision drew criticism from commentators,
academics, and attorneys who criticized the insurmountable
burden Swain placed on the criminal defendant alleging dis-
crimination.63 Many called for complete abolition of peremp-
tory challenges,' while others insisted that retention of the
peremptory challenge was necessary to administer justice65
58. "In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white,
Protestant, and Catholic are subject to being challenged without cause." Id.
at 221.
59. Id. at 222-24. On the other hand, the Swain Court did endorse the use
of peremptory challenges on the basis of "race, religion, nationality, occupa-
tion, or affiliations" of potential jurors if the state allowed. Id. at 220.
60. Id. at 223-24.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 227.
63. See Coleman, supra note 18, at 1122 (noting that the author's re-
search failed to uncover a single instance of a successful challenge under the
Swain test); Scruggs, supra note 18, at 555 (noting that rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of legitimate prosecutorial action "proved almost impossible"); Swift,
supra note 28, at 344-45 (discussing the actions criminal defendants needed to
take to meet the Court's burden of proof).
64. See Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Ma-
nipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 192, 233-34 (1978) (arguing that prosecutorial abuse of peremptories
mandates abolition unless courts can effectively intervene to prevent abuse);
George Bundy Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptory Challenges to
Strike Blacks from Juries, 27 How. L.J. 1571, 1591-95 (1984) (asserting that
discriminatory use of peremptories must be stopped); Brent J. Gurney, Note,
The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 244-46 (1986) (arguing for abolition of peremptory
challenges).
65. See Babcock, supra note 18, at 1175 ("[T]otal elimination of the per-
emptory challenge is ill-advised as it would focus jury selection entirely on the
challenge for cause."). The result is that the judge alone would shape the jury
composition in a series of "practically unreviewable decisions." Id. Jury trials
are guaranteed precisely to prevent such unilateral actions by judges. Id.
Further, elimination of the peremptory challenge would make it difficult for
attorneys to make challenges for cause because vigorous questioning in voir
dire might antagonize jurors. Id. at 1176. The peremptory challenge makes
vigorous questioning possible. Id.; see also Germano, supra note 30, at 436-38
(asserting that the peremptory challenge is crucial to formation of impartial
[Vol. 81:12371246
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and could be reconciled with the dictates of equal protection.
66
Nevertheless, an increase in the number of minority members
summoned for jury service during the twenty-one years follow-
ing Swain highlighted the potential for abuse of peremptory
challenges. 67 Some states prohibited discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges under their state constitutions.6' Not surpris-
juries); Underwood, supra note 30, at 761 (arguing for modification of the per-
emptory challenge as opposed to abolition). Underwood argues that the anti-
discrimination principles are more important than peremptory challenges but
that the two are not irreconcilable. Id. Modified peremptory challenges are
worth preserving because they allow exclusion ofjurors who evidence possible
bias, but not to the level justifying a challenge for cause. Id. at 762. So-called
"arbitrary" peremptory challenges are not a concern because attorneys and
litigants normally have reasons for their actions, and courts are more than
capable of disallowing those that are wholly arbitrary. Id. at 763-64; see also
Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 563 (1975) (claiming that the voir dire system should be ex-
panded to allow better use of peremptory challenges necessary to effectuate
justice); Steven M. Puiszis, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will the Per-
emptory Challenge Survive Its Battle with the Equal Protection Clause?, 25 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 37, 80 (1991) (discussing the vital role peremptory chal-
lenges play in the justice system and approving the Court's seeming unwill-
ingness to eliminate the peremptory challenge).
66. See Babcock, supra note 18, at 1174-79 (arguing for retention of the
peremptory challenge by reworking the jury selection process by broadening
the jury pool, statutorily forbidding race and gender discrimination in the ex-
ercise of challenges, reducing the number of peremptories allowed in relation
to the size of the petit jury, improving voir dire techniques, and using af-
firmative selection techniques). Babcock argues that the Supreme Court's in-
tervention into jury selection in Batson creates an opportunity to call on legis-
latures to pass modern statutes to effectuate the antidiscrimination principles
of Batson. Id. at 1176; see also Germano, supra note 30, at 449-50 (arguing for
improvement of voir dire techniques focusing on "psychographic, rather than
demographic, characteristics of prospective jurors" to prevent dependence on
stereotypes that are often erroneous); Swift, supra note 28, at 337-38 (arguing
for adoption of a pretext test distinguishing "hard-data" explanations for a
peremptory challenge, which are generally verifiable and should be allowed,
from "soft-data" explanations, which are frequently based on "intuition" and
should not be accepted). Affirmative selection means, after the initial voir
dire and challenges for cause, each side prepares a list of 12 preferred jurors
in order of preference. Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New
Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 806 (1986).
Judges first select mutual choices, then alternate between the two lists in de-
scending order until 12 jurors are seated. Id.
67. For a discussion of the changes in the justice system that resulted in
increased numbers of minorities summoned for jury service, see Babcock, su-
pra note 18, at 1147-49.
68, State v. Super. Ct., 760 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc); People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-78 (Cal. 1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012
(Del. 1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516-17 (Mass. 1979); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d
716, 718 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). Additionally, two Courts of Appeals followed
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ingly, the Supreme Court decided to reexamine the discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges.
C. BATSON V. KENTUCKY AND ITS PROGENY: REDEFINING
"PEREMPTORY"
In 1986, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of race and
peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky.19 The Batson
Court set out a three-step test to determine if racial prejudice
impermissibly motivated a peremptory challenge or series of
challenges. 70  First, the criminal defendant must establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination71 by showing that
he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group,7 2 that per-
emptory challenges permit discrimination," and that these
facts and other "relevant circumstances" raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination.74 Once the defendant makes the
prima facie showing, the burden shifts under the second step to
the prosecution to provide a neutral explanation for the chal-
this trend, holding that the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
might violate the Sixth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 n.1
(1986) (citing Broker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985); McCray v. Abrams,
750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984)).
69. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Batson Court faced a dilemma: the precedent
of Swain made rejection of the equal protection argument probable. See supra
notes 53-62 (discussing the holding and reasoning of Swain). Accordingly, the
appellant did not raise the equal protection issue, arguing instead that his
Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Scruggs, supra note 18, at 560. In
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the Court specifically rejected appli-
cation of the Sixth Amendment to the petit jury as unworkable. Babcock, su-
pra note 18, at 1153. In order to place limits on discriminatory peremptory
challenges, the Court necessarily had to review and overturn precedent. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4 (noting that the Court agreed with the state that
Batson's claim implicated the Fourteenth rather than the Sixth Amendment).
"We... express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment
arguments." Id. at 85 n.4.
70. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
71. Id. at 96.
72. Id. (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
73. Id. (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
74. Id. at 96-97. Although the Court gave two examples of "relevant cir-
cumstances," it relied on the trial courts to develop criteria for establishing a
prima facie case. Id. at 97. The Coures examples are a pattern of strikes
against black jurors and prosecutor statements and questions during both voir
dire and the challenge process. Id. The defendant could now draw on the
facts of his own case and trial, id., eliminating Swain's "systematic use" prong.
"Batson gave no specific direction as to the measure of a prima facie case."
Melilli, supra note 30, at 470. "[1In most cases, the task for the court is to de-
termine what constitutes a 'pattern' of strikes against the targeted group ... 
Id. at 471.
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lenges.75 The neutral explanation should be related to the cir-
cumstances of the case.76 Under Batson's final step, the trial
court determines whether the prosecution's neutral explana-
tion sufficiently rebuts the defendant's inference of purposeful
discrimination. 77 The burden of persuasion as to the presence
of purposeful discrimination remains on the defendant.7 8 Al-
though the Court did not specifically address the remedy for a
Batson violation,7 9 the trial court may recall the excluded ju-
rors or dismiss all the jurors and start the jury selection proc-
ess over.80 The remedy applied by appellate courts has been
reversal and a new trial.8 '
The Batson Court sought to eliminate discrimination in
jury selection to protect three specific groups. First, the Court
intended Batson to protect the criminal defendant's right to a
75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Court stated that the explanation need
not "rise to the level justifying ... a challenge for cause," but that simply
stating his or her assumptions or intuition that a challenged juror would be
partial to one of his or her own race is insufficient. Id. Nor is a mere denial of
discriminatory motive sufficient to rebut the prima facie case. Id. at 98. The
neutral explanation should be related to the facts of the case. Id.
Attorneys naturally developed expertise at proffering neutral explana-
tions. Attorneys "can so easily rebut a prima facie case that the Cours equal
protection guarantees are illusory." Mintz, supra note 34, at 1036. "Facially
neutral reasons for striking a juror are easy to assert and difficult to second
guess." Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21, 33 (1993). This was Jus-
tice Marshall's argument for banning peremptories in his Batson concurrence.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra note 93 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Marshall's Batson concurrence).
76. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. "The prosecutor therefore must articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Id.
77. The Court went no further in providing guidance to the lower courts
on determining the presence of purposeful discrimination. "Te Supreme
Court leaves the translation of large edicts like those in the Batson line to the
offices and officers of the courts below." Babcock, supra note 18, at 1174.
This left the courts with the problem of "enforcing a standard without a clear
perimeter" because the Court failed to provide lower courts with practical
guidance for analyzing the various reasons an attorney might submit as race
neutral. Swift, supra note 28, at 361. For a discussion of the various methods
courts developed to examine neutral explanations and their effectiveness, see
Melilli, supra note 30, at 478-83.
78. "he trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant
has established purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (emphasis
added).
79. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury
Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 94-95 (1996).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 95.
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fair jury chosen without discrimination,8 2 as was also true of
the Court in Strauder83 Another primary concern of the Bat-
son Court, again like Strauder, was protection of the right of
the prospective juror to serve. Finally, because discriminatory
jury selection practices can render jury verdicts suspect in the
eyes of the general public84 as well as promote continuing dis-
crimination and prejudice in society at large, 5 elimination of
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87. "Purposeful discrimination in selection of
the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies
him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." Id. at 86.
83. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
Strauder holding and reasoning).
84. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. "The harm... extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Se-
lection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries un-
.dermine public confidence in our system of justice." Id. "[T]he American
public envisions a proper jury as representative of the community .... "
Scruggs, supra note 18, at 580. "Discriminatory jury selection undermines
[public] confidence in the jury's neutrality, its ability to adhere to the law, and
the fairness of the verdict it determines." Id. at 581. Media commonly report
on the gender and racial make up of juries. Id. at 582. This is particularly
true in high profile cases. For example, questioning the initial venire in the
O.J. Simpson wrongful death civil case resulted in a jury composed of nine
whites, one African American, one Latino, and one person of mixed race. Eight
Alternate Jurors Set for Simpson Civil Trial, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 22, 1996,
at A3. The panel of eight alternate jurors (five male, three female) included
five whites, one Asian, and one Latino. Id.
The failure to attain a jury the public can regard as fair has had tragic
consequences in the recent past. In the first trial of white police officers ac-
cused of beating motorist Rodney King, the defense used its peremptory chal-
lenges to shape a jury that "looked racially like the defendants." Babcock, su-
pra note 18, at 1140. The result of the negative image created by the King
trial and verdict "spilled out into the Los Angeles streets." Id.; see also Mi-
chael J. Desmond, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v.
McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 CATH. U. L.
REV. 389, 390 (1993) (noting that the result of the Rodney King trial makes
clear the "far-reaching impact of appearances of impropriety in jury composi-
tion and selection").
The Court acknowledges the continued importance of public opinion and
perceptions of the jury system. One of the primary reasons the Court chose to
extend Batson's requirements to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges
was the fear that discrimination by either party undermines public confidence
in the jury system. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-50, 59 (1992). Simi-
larly, in extending Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges,
the Court stated that the "community is harmed by the State's participation
in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of
confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the
courtroom engenders." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427
(1994).
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
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discrimination in the courtroom increases public confidence in
the jury system.86
In the years following Batson, the Supreme Court's focus
on the equal protection rights of the prospective juror became
more explicit.87 In addition, the Court frequently expanded the
reach of Batson. First, the Court eliminated the requirement
that the challenging defendant be a member of the same race
as the excluded juror.88 The Court then applied Batson to civil
litigants.8 9 Next, criminal defendants became subject to the
86. Id.
87. Even in Batson, the Court implicitly focused on the rights of the ex-
cluded juror. "The fact is that Batson only makes analytical sense if one rec-
ognizes that it has shifted the primary focus from the rights of the litigants to
the rights of prospective jurors." Melilli, supra note 30, at 453. "Batson and
its progeny gradually set the stage for J.E.B. by shifting the focus away from
the defendant to the excluded juror." Scruggs, supra note 18, at 572. Such a
focus on the excluded juror is appropriate because the use of peremptories in
a discriminatory manner, sanctioned by the court, places a "judicial imprima-
tur on discrimination." Broderick, supra note 28, at 400. The state's interest,
regardless of how compelling it might be, cannot be advanced by a peremptory
challenge because the challenge, by its nature, has no objective basis. Id. at
401. The line of cases following Batson "privileged the jury's appearance over
preservation of the peremptory challenge ... and over the peculiar needs of
the criminally accused." Babcock, supra note 18, at 1157. That the right of
the citizen to participate overcomes the right of the litigant to remove jurors
without cause, particularly when the reason is discriminatory, was made ex-
plicit in Ednonson. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630
(1991).
88. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). The Court decided that the
defendant had standing to raise the rights of the excluded juror because the
relationship between litigant and juror is sufficiently close to convey third
party standing. Id. at 413-15. Further, the two have a common interest in
eliminating discrimination from the courtroom. Id. at 413. The practical real-
ity that an excluded juror will not challenge his or her own exclusion makes
allowing the litigant to do so acceptable. Id. at 413-16.
89. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 629 (1991). Application of Batson in a civil
context required classifying litigants as state actors, for which the Court util-
ized the test from Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620-21. First, peremptory challenges clearly have
their source in state authority because their sole purpose is to permit the liti-
gant to assist the government in selecting an impartial jury. Id. Peremptory
challenges exist because the government allows them. Id. The private liti-
gant can be considered a state actor when exercising the peremptory chal-
lenge. Id. at 621-22. The extensive use of state procedures and the "overt,
significant participation" of the government justifies the characterization of
peremptory challenges as state action. Id. Extensive involvement of the
judge implicates the judicial system in the state action. Id. at 623-34. The
Court stated if race discrimination is the price to be paid for the perception of
a fair jury, the price is too high. Id. at 630 (emphasis added). Advancement
of this multiracial society requires recognition that "automatic invocation of
125119971
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same antidiscriminationory peremptory challenge rules prose-
cutors must followf 0 Finally, the Court extended impermissi-
ble bases for peremptory challenges to national origin and
gender. 92 These expansions of Batson have led commentators
race stereotypes retards... progress and causes continued hurt and injury."
Id. at 630-31.
90. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58-59 (1992). Of primary concern
to the McCollum Court was public perception of fairness in jury selection. Id.
at 49-50. The Court utilized the same analysis underpinning Edmonson in
characterizing the criminal defendant as a state actor when utilizing peremp-
tory challenges. Id. at 51-55.
91. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991). According to the
Court, had the state exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos
because of their ethnicity, it would have violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
While the extension of Batson to national origin and ethnicity was a nec-
essary but implicit holding of Hernandez, it is arguable that the case signaled
the beginning of a retreat. The statement that a pattern striking only mi-
norities is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination di-
rectly conflicted with Batson's statement that a pattern of strikes against
black jurors is a relevant circumstance that can establish a prima facie case.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); see also text accompanying supra
notes 71-74 (discussing the Batson prima facie case and noting that the courts
must try to determine whether a pattern of strikes exists). However, the
Court failed in Hernandez to apply the Batson test appropriately. It accepted
that there was a prima facie case of discrimination, but then failed to look be-
yond the facial neutrality of the proffered explanation, choosing instead to de-
fer to the findings of the trial court. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364. The Court
explained that this was necessary because decisions as to whether neutral
explanations are pretextual usually depend on the credibility of the attorney
offering the explanation, which the trial court is necessarily in a better posi-
tion to judge. Id. at 365; see also Swift, supra note 28, at 356 (asserting that
the Court skipped steps in Hernandez). Swift notes that the Hernandez Court
based its decision on an incorrect assumption-that the prosecutor had asked
each excluded juror the questions the answers to which he later used as neu-
tral explanations. Id. Swift concludes that the failure to apply Batson's third
step to examine the proffered explanation reduces Batson to a "superficial
check" for only the "most egregious forms of discrimination." Id. The result is
an unsuccessful struggle in lower courts to apply this "amorphous and confus-
ing test." Id. at 357.
92. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994). J.E.B.
dealt with a paternity suit in which the state of Alabama was challenged for
removing all the males from the petit jury with peremptory challenges. Id. at
1421-22. Justice Blackmun reviewed the history of discrimination against
women in determining that gender-based peremptory challenges violate equal
protection principles. Id. at 1422-24, 1430. The State argued that it per-
ceived men as more sympathetic to the defendanfs position, but the Court
stated it would not "accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges the very stereotype the law condemns." Id. at 1426 (quoting Powers,
499 U.S. at 410).
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to anticipate either further limits on permissible use of per-
emptory challenges or total abolition of the practice.
93
93. Some concerns have been raised as to the limits of Batson-type
analysis in light of the J.E.B. result, at least partially because race and gen-
der "coexist with all of the other demographic classifications that most, if not
all, litigators at least consider during voir dire." Germano, supra note 30, at
442. "[T]he Courts decisions on the constitutionality of the peremptory chal-
lenge forecast its elimination." Jason Hochberg, Peremptory Challenge: An
American Relic Like the Model-T Ford and the $2 Bill, Its Time Has Passed,
10 CRIM. JUST. 10, 52 (1996). Further, in the absence of "any demonstrable
countervailing government interest furthered by the concededly arbitrary and
impressionistic exercise of authority represented by the peremptory results in
the inevitable conclusion that it cannot survive any level of equal protection
scrutiny, no matter how lenient." Broderick, supra note 28, at 401. But see
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 ("Our conclusion that litigants may not strike po-
tential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of
all peremptory challenges."); Germano, supra note 30, at 434 (arguing that
denial of certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), ef-
fectively eliminates application of Batson to religion-based peremptories and
makes further extensions unlikely); Scruggs, supra note 18, at 583-84
(asserting that the Court will continue to refuse to extend Batson).
Justice Marshall's Batson concurrence specifically called for the abolition
of the practice. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). He argued that Batson's limitations were clear from the results
in states that already restricted discriminatory peremptory challenges. Id. at
103. "The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury
process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally
lead the Court to ban them entirely .... " Id. at 107. Batson, he predicted,
would leave prosecutors "free to discriminate against blacks in jury selection
provided that they hold that discrimination to an 'acceptable' level." Id. at
105.
Marshall argued that attorneys make discriminatory racial challenges
without awareness of their own motives and that the same unconscious ra-
cism may lead judges to accept pretextual explanations as true. Id. at 106.
The Court did not respond to this argument because they could not do so and
retain the peremptory. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1023 (1988). "Social scientists
would tell us that Marshall is right...." Id.
Part of the reason commentators have called for the elimination of the
peremptory altogether is that Justice Marshall's prediction proved correct.
For a description of the ease with which lawyers side-step the requirements of
Batson, see Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer
Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimina-
tion from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 632-36 (1994); see also Swift,
supra note 28, at 358-61 (noting the inconsistent results among lower courts).
For example, proffered neutral explanations such as residence, age, prosecu-
torial intuition, body language, and prior involvement with the law are con-
sidered pretextual in some jurisdictions and unimpeachable in others. Id. at
359. There is no consensus "about the validity of these reasons or how to
analyze them." Id.
The real issue in the abolition argument is "whether attorneys or their
clients, with imperfect knowledge and in spite of their own prejudices, should
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Lower court application of the three-step Batson test has
yielded mixed results at best. On the one hand, application of
the Batson three-step test has refocused attention on the rights
of citizens called to jury service.94 Moreover, the debate over
Batson caused the legal system to acknowledge that there is a
difference between the constitutionally-guaranteed impartial
jury and a partial jury, for which there is no right.95 On the
other hand, there are wide variations in administration of the
three-step test itself.96 In some states, the establishment of the
prima facie case of discrimination under Batson's first step is a
huge obstacle,97 while other states require very little to shift
the burden to the party who must provide a neutral explana-
tion under step two." Significantly, courts have also struggled
have the prerogative of using peremptory challenges to deny persons the con-
stitutional right to be jurors in order to accomplish their objective of obtain-
ing, not an impartial jury, but a jury which would be partial." Broderick, su-
pra note 28, at 411; see also Mintz, supra note 34, at 1038 ("The only effective
way to protect against discriminatory jury challenges is to eliminate peremp-
tory challenges completely."). But see Germano, supra note 30, at 442-43
(arguing that the combination of overlap between characteristics legally al-
lowed as challenges and race and gender and the specific support the Court
has given the peremptory challenge make abolition unlikely); Horwitz, supra
note 18, at 1437-39 (arguing that the "unique and essential" function of the
peremptory challenge mandates its retention); Scruggs, supra note 18, at 578
(stating that the rights of jurors are not "threatened to the point" where
elimination of the peremptory challenge is necessary).
One argument for retention that clearly fails is any claim of diminished
use of prejudice and stereotypes in jury selection. See Broderick, supra note
28, at 399 (noting that even its defenders acknowledge that erroneous stereo-
types drive peremptory challenges); Germano, supra note 30, at 436-38
(noting that litigators seek "ideal juror[s]" favorable to their case and use
stereotypes based on demographics that are not dispositive and result in
"erroneous generalizations and discrimination"); Horwitz, supra note 18, at
1403 (noting that the inability to discern bias through voir dire questioning
leads to inclinations to rely on perceived group characteristics, many of which
are stereotypical).
94. Melilli, supra note 30, at 503.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 470-78 (discussing the results of the author's empirical
study of all reported cased in which there was a Batson challenge).
97. Id. at 466. Melilli cites Louisiana as an example and shows that
claimants successfully established a prima facie case only 32.7% of the time.
Id. at 466-67. Success rates in establishing a prima facie case vary from 0% to
100%. Id. at 467.
98. Id. at 466-67. Melilli cites Alabama, California, Florida, New York,
and Texas as examples and shows that Batson claimants successfiflly estab-
lish the prima facie case 65.2%, 70.8%, 91.3%, 74.5%, and 84.4% of the time,
respectively. Id. Mehlli identifies eight methods by which courts examine
claims to determine the existence of the prima facie case. Id. at 471-72. He
concludes that courts using these methods "bungled the task of defining a
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to produce consistent results in the evaluation of the neutral
explanations under Batson's third step.99  One empirical
study,100 examining all published federal and state court deci-
sions in which Batson challenges occurred, concluded that this
inconsistency and the additional burdens of increased litiga-
tion, time, and cost added to the judicial system by the Batson
three-step test render Batson a resounding failure.
10 1
D. PURKETT V. ELEM: A RETREAT FROM BATSON?
Whether intentional or not, the Supreme Court's most re-
cent peremptory challenge decision, Purkett v. Elem,02 re-
'pattern' of unlawful strikes." Id. at 474. For a complete discussion of these
methods and their attendant flaws, see id. at 471-78.
99. Batson challenges are raised almost exclusively in the context of
criminal trials and almost exclusively by defendants. Id. at 458. Success in a
Batson challenge is rare, with a success rate of only about 18% overall (as of
1995). Id. at 459.
[Olne has to wonder why, for example, over 68% of the Batson com-
plainants ultimately prevailed in Florida while only two of sixty-eight
Batson complainants ultimately prevailed in Louisiana .... At the
very least, the data suggests that the criteria used by courts in meas-
uring both the existence of a prima facie case and the adequacy of
proffered explanations is by no means uniform.
Id. at 470. Criminal defense attorneys appear relatively unselective about
raising Batson challenges and are disproportionately unsuccessful. Id. at 459.
Conversely, prosecutors are more selective and have the highest rate of suc-
cess in rebutting the prima facie case. Id. Virtually all Batson challenges are
brought on claims of racial discrimination, with a substantial majority aimed
at excluding African Americans. Id. at 462. The lowest rate of successful Bat-
son claims occur when an attorney strikes an African American or a Hispanic.
Id.
Melilli outlines 11 classifications of neutral explanations as proffered by
Batson respondents. Id. at 479. Explanations that are considered inherently
inadequate in one jurisdiction are routinely accepted in others. Id. at 481.
Courts have struggled to find some middle ground between preserving the
traditional nature of the peremptory challenge and providing the consistent
scrutiny Batson requires. Id. at 483. "IAin inherent difficulty lies in requiring
acceptable reasons in circumstances in which, because the persons struck are
not subject to challenges for cause, there cannot be truly persuasive reasons
for their removal." Id. "In the final analysis, the courts have struggled with
evaluating proffered neutral explanations, producing no more consis-
tency ... than they have produced in the prima facie case arena." Id. For a
further discussion of the problems federal courts have encountered applying
Batson, see Swift, supra note 28, at 357-61.
100. See Swift, supra note 28.
10L Id. at 503. Based on the survey, application of Batson proves that
preserving the "essential nature" of the peremptory challenge is impossible
when trying to prevent discriminatory jury selection at the same time. Id.
102. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam). Elem, an African American on
trial for second-degree robbery, challenged the peremptory strikes made
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ignited the debate over the constitutionality of the peremptory
challenge. The Court ostensibly reaffirmed Batson,"°3 but re-
articulated the second step of the Batson test.1°4 Noting that
the lower court erred in collapsing the second and third Batson
steps,105 the per curiam opinion held that the proffered neutral
explanation for the challenge need not be persuasive or plau-
sible to satisfy the second step as long as it is race-neutral.106
The Court characterized the Batson requirement that the ex-
planation be related to the case being tried as a warning to
prosecutors that the burden of production under the second
step could not be satisfied with a mere denial of discriminatory
motive. 07 The Court stated that the third step of the Batson
test is the point at which the persuasiveness of the explanation
becomes relevant. 0 8 Further, the opinion noted that courts
would likely find "silly or superstitious" explanations to be pre-
textual.109 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, vigorously
dissented,110 objecting to the elimination of the requirement
that the neutral explanation be related to the circumstances of
the case."' According to the dissent, lower courts will interpret
the decision to allow any neutral explanation to rebut a prima
against two of the three African Americans on the jury venire. Id. at 1770.
The prosecutor volunteered that he struck one juror because he had long hair,
a mustache, and a goatee-type beard. Id. The trial court overruled Elem's
objections. Id.
103. Id. at 1770-71.
104. Id. at 1771.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. "What it means... is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason
that does not deny equal protection." Id.
108. "It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justifica-
tion becomes relevant-the step in which the trial court determines whether
the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination." Id. (emphasis added). Termination of the inquiry at step two
violates the "principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Cf Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770 (1995); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). The dissent stated, "It is not too much to ask that a
prosecutor's explanation for his strikes be race neutral, reasonably specific,
and trial related. Nothing less will serve to rebut the inference of race-based
discrimination that arises when the defendant has made out a prima facie
case." Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1774 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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facie case of discrimination, even if the neutral explanation is
"implausible or fantastic," or "silly or superstitious."" 2
The fallout from the Purkett decision is as yet unknown,
but there are indications that some state courts may not follow
its dictates."1 One judge, however, stated categorically that
Purkett changes nothing. 4 Other commentators insist that
the decision makes defeating a Batson challenge easier. 5 Re-
112. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also An Ex-
planation Is Necessary, but It Doesn't Have to Make Sense, 10 FED. LITIGATOR
150, 150 (1995) (noting that, pursuant to Purkett, it is not good enough to
simply deny a discriminatory motive, but the reason offered need not make
sense).
113. In Alabama, one supreme court judge spoke to the reliance of a lower
court on Purkett and Hernandez. Ex parte Bruner, 681 So. 2d 173, 173 (Ala.
1996) (per curiam) (Cook, J., concurring specially), quashing cert. granted to
Bruner v. Cawthon, 681 So. 2d 161 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). This judge stated
that the state's peremptory challenge procedure is not a matter of federal law.
Id. at 174. The Alabama Constitution requires the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to be tested under a rule similar to that in Batson. Id. at 176.
The absence [in other Alabama peremptory challenge decisions] of a
reference... to Batson or any other federal authority was conspicu-
ous and intentional, for the Court sought to reinforce the idea-if it
needed any reinforcement-that peremptory strikes in Alabama were
to be subject to review based on adequate and independent state law.
Id. at 177. Hernandez and Purkett abrogated any correlation between the fed-
eral standard and the standard of the state of Alabama. Id. at 181-82. But
see id. at 182-85 (Maddox, J., concurring in the result) (refuting Judge Cook's
claim that there is an independent state law ground for Batson challenges).
In California, a potential split developed in the appellate courts when the
Second District rejected Purkett as a basis for its decision. Stephanie Stone,
California Appeal Court Says Juror's 'Lack of Eye Contact" Insufficient Ex-
planation for Peremptory Challenge, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, March 19, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 259133. The court called Purkett "a digression from
prior federal law." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that California courts
are required to follow People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 757-58 (Cal. 1978). Id.
Wheeler held that discriminatory peremptory challenges violate the right to
trial by jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. Id.
This right is guaranteed under the California Constitution. Id.
114. Bruner, 681 So. 2d at 185-86 (Maddox, J., concurring in the result).
The judge argued that Purkett did not back away from the basic assumption of
Batson, which is that the assumption that a racial group cannot serve as im-
partial jurors is not acceptable. Id.
115. See Peremptory Challenge Decision Is Modified: Justices Divide 7-2
Over Type of Reason Sufficient to Justify Exclusion of Jurors, N.Y.L.J., May
16, 1995, at 1 (stating that the Court made it easier to defend against accusa-
tions of discrimination); Richard Carelli, It May Be Easier to Find Excuses to
Exclude Jurors, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 1995, at A5 (arguing that the Pur-
kett Court made it easier for prosecutors to fight off accusations that they ex-
cluded jurors on the basis of race); see also Joan Biskupic, Court Acts in Housing
Bias Dispute: Zoning Can't Be Used to Exclude Group Homes for Disabled, Jus-
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actions among practicing attorneys vary."6 In light of these
various opinions, the Supreme Court will most likely have to
revisit this subject again.'1 7
II. MINETOS V. CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Minetos brought claims of national origin, accent, and age
discrimination to trial before a jury in late 1995.118 Following a
jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Minetos moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the defendants' use of peremp-
tory challenges was racially motivated." 9 Minetos had appro-
priately raised this issue during jury selection, and at that
time, the court concluded that the defendants' peremptory
challenges were discriminatory under Batson.120  The court
reasoned that the defendants' proffered neutral explanations
hid discriminatory intent, because in striking one Hispanic and
two African American jurors, the defendants created the
"unmistakable pattern" Batson intended to eliminate.121 While
the court denied Minetos's request that it recall the excluded
jurors for service, the court did state that Minetos would be
entitled to a new trial if the jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendants. 1
22
Yet, when the jury found in the defendants' favor and Mi-
netos moved for a new trial,'23 the court denied the motion.'24
tices Say, WASI. POST, May 16, 1995, at A3 (stating that the Court "enhanced"
the ability of prosecutors to defend against charges of discrimination).
116. See Carter, supra note 115 (noting that reactions ranged from a lack
of concern to several lawyers' acknowledgments of the biased bases for many
challenges and their concern for the effect of the decision on justice).
117. At least one commentator expresses the opinion that Purkett may be a
preliminary step in eliminating peremptory challenges. See Joan E. Inbriani,
Survey, Prosecution's Explanation for Exercising Peremptory Challenge Need
Only Be Race Neutral, Not Persuasive or Plausible, Where Intentional Racial
Discrimination Is Alleged-Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per cu-
riam), 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 911, 915-16 (1996) (arguing that if the Court
sees unjust results and practices in the cases following Purkett, it may follow
Justice Marshall's advice and ban the peremptory challenge completely).
118. Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
119. Id. at 180.
120. Id. at 179-80. Minetos argued that the defendants removed one His-
panic and two African American jurors, and that these removals were based
on discriminatory motives. Id. at 180.
121. Id. at 182.
122. Id. at 180.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 185.
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The court at that time revisited defense objections that were
noted during the jury selection process. The defense argued
that Minetos herself used all of her peremptory challenges to
strike white men from the jury.125 Again applying the three-
step Batson analysis,126 the court determined that the neutral
reasons Minetos proffered for these challenges were a cover for
discriminatory motives. 127 Accordingly, the court ruled that
Minetos's "unclean hands" justified reversal of its earlier deci-
sion and denial of Minetos's motion for a new trial.
128
Having effectively relied on Batson to unmask invidious
discrimination, the Minetos court nonetheless denied the effec-
tiveness of the test and excoriated the peremptory challenge.
1 29
The court reasoned that the nature of the peremptory chal-
lenge invites corruption of the judicial system13° because it al-
lows attorneys, deliberately or unconsciously, to utilize pretex-
tual neutral explanations as a mask for discrimination.13' In
addition, the court noted that attempts to make Batson work-
able by delineating explanations courts should presume pre-
textual, 132 serve more as a guide to those seeking to defeat a
125. Id. at 180.
126. Id. at 182. The defense established its prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under Batson's first step, noting that the plaintiff struck only white male
jurors. Id. The plaintiff stated that she removed these jurors because the
plaintiff viewed them as pro-management. Id.
127. The court, analyzing Minetos's neutral explanation under the third
Batson step, noted that the New York business community is "overwhelmingly
and disproportionately white." Id. The credibility of the plaintiffs explana-
tion was thus suspect as a cover for discriminatory motive. Id. Further, un-
der New York appellate court guidelines, using peremptory challenges based
on employment is "explicitly presumed pretextual." Id.
128. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs discriminatory use of her peremptory challenges de-
fies the only reason for having them and violates each excluded
juror's rights, irrespective of the final racial makeup of the jury.
Plaintiffs 'unclean hands' in this regard leave her poorly situated
to complain about unfair treatment at trial and counsels strongly
against the grant of a new one.
Id. at 183.
129. Id. at 183-85.
130. Id. at 183.
13L Id. at 184-85.
132. Judge Motley pointed to guidelines drawn up by the New York appel-
late courts "to help trial courts apply Batson's second step" as an example of
such failure. Id. The guidelines list those reasons that should be presumed
pretextual and those that should be presumed legitimate. Id. at 184.
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Batson challenge.'33 The new standard articulated in Purkett,
according the Minetos court, can only make matters worse be-
cause it is unclear what neutral explanations would not satisfy
its second step.'34 The court argued that Purkett likely will re-
sult in even more vexatious litigation.'35
The Minetos court further reasoned that judicial experi-
ence shows that Batson fails to uncover discrimination and
protect the juror's right to serve because attorneys simply gen-
erate neutral reasons for challenges that courts are ill-
equipped to second guess. 136 In support of this reasoning, the
court cited inconsistent lower court applications of the Batson
three-step test.13 7 The court determined that inability to find a
workable test renders the protections of Batson and Purkett
"illusory."138 The Minetos court then decided that peremptory
challenges per se violate equal protection and concluded that
completely banning the practice is the only answer to ending
discrimination in the courtroom. 139
III. MINETOS: CHALLENGING THE FUTURE OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Future courts should join Minetos in calling for an end to
peremptory challenges. Minetos correctly recognizes that lower
court confusion and inconsistent application of the three-step
Batson test frustrate the intent of Batson and its progeny. In
addition, although a departure from precedent, the solution
proposed in Minetos is more consistent with equal protection
principles than the current Supreme Court test. Finally,
elimination of the peremptory challenge is sound policy be-
cause nondiscriminatory jury selection processes increase pub-
lic confidence in the jury system and the verdicts it renders.
133. Id. Judge Motley referred to the guidelines as a "how-to guide for de-
feating Batson challenges." Id.
134. Id. at 181.
135. Id. at 183.
136. Id. at 183-84.
137. Id. The court noted that neutral explanations found pretextual in one
case are accepted to rebut the prima facie case in others. Id.
138. Id. at 185. "In short, lawyers can easily generate facially neutral rea-
sons for striking jurors and trial courts are hard pressed to second-guess
them, rendering Batson and Purkett's protections illusory." Id.
139. Id.
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A MINETOS CORRECTLY RECOGNIZES THAT BATSON PROVIDES
INCONSISTENT PROTECTION TO LITIGANTS AND POTENTIAL
JURORS
1. Batson: A Lack of Guidance and Resulting Inconsistency
Diminishes Protection of Litigants and Prospective Jurors
The Minetos court correctly noted that a major problem
with the Batson test is its failure to provide lower courts with
guidance in its application. Although the Batson Court stated
that the necessary "relevant circumstances" may include a pat-
tern of strikes against a given racial group and the questions
asked in voir dire, 140 the Court left development of specific cri-
teria for establishing a prima facie case to the lower courts. 141
The result is that litigants making Batson challenges face dif-
fering standards in different courts." Some courts, including
state courts in New York, Alabama, Texas, and California, re-
quire only minimal levels of proof to move the inquiry to the
second step. 43 Other courts, including Louisiana state courts,
make establishment of the prima facie case virtually impossi-
ble,1' rendering the rest of the Batson test and its protections
moot. Differing standards mean that prospective jurors face
inconsistent levels of protection for their right to serve on a
jury and litigants face inconsistent protection for their right to
an impartial jury chosen in a nondiscriminatory manner.
The Minetos court also correctly recognized that the Bat-
son Court did not provide guidance to lower courts in applying
the third step of the test. Under Batson, mere denials of dis-
criminatory motive, intuition, or assumptions of partiality are
not acceptable explanations, but the proffered explanation
need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. 145 Problems
arise because attorneys are experts at developing facially neu-
tral explanations for peremptory challenges, true or not, and
140. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
141. See supra notes 71-74 (discussing the Batson prima facie case crite-
ria).
142. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (noting inconsistent
application of the Batson test by state courts).
143. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that minimal evi-
dence is required to move the Batson inquiry to the second step in some
states).
144- See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that establishment
of a prima facie case is a huge obstacle in some states).
145. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 19, 97-99; see supra note 75 (discussing
Batson's third step analysis).
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courts are required to determine if those reasons are pretexts
for discrimination. 4 6 Courts attempting to second guess attor-
ney motives often face not only this expertise but also their
own unconscious racism. 4 In applying the third step of the
Batson analysis and examining virtually the same proffered
explanations in similar circumstances, lower courts have
reached opposing results. 41 The Supreme Court itself has
failed to properly apply the Batson test,149 demonstrating the
difficulty inherent in applying Batson and providing a mixed
message to lower courts. Furthermore, lower court attempts to
develop guidelines for determining that a proffered neutral
explanation is pretextual have produced levels of inconsistency
similar to that found in the context of the prima facie case.150
The protection courts provide for the prospective juror's right
to serve and the litigant's right to a fair jury chosen without
discrimination are thus also inconsistent.
2. The Unworkable Test Frustrates Batson's Intent to Protect
Jurors
The Minetos court specifically noted the lack of lower court
consistency as evidence that Batson provides an unworkable
test.' 51  Despite the fact that inexplicable stereotypes and
prejudice remain prevalent in society and in the courts, 5 2 a
successful Batson challenge remains a rarity.'53 Consequently,
the potential juror's exposure to discriminatory peremptory
challenges continues virtually unabated while courts continue
to struggle within an unworkable framework.
Minetos further demonstrates one way in which the spe-
cific intent of Batson to protect prospective jurors is frustrated.
146. See supra text accompanying note 75 (describing the expertise of at-
torneys at developing neutral explanations to rebut the inference of purpose-
ful discrimination and the courts' role in evaluating those neutral explana-
tions).
147. See supra note 91 (discussing the effect of unconscious racism on Bat-
son results).
148. See supra note 93 (discussing the inconsistent results of Batson in
application).
149. See supra note 91 (critiquing the Court's Hernandez analysis).
150. See supra notes 97-98 (reviewing the results of Melilli's study of Bat-
son in application and the resulting inconsistency in lower courts).
151. Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp 177, 183-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
152. See supra note 93 (noting that stereotypes and prejudice remain
prevalent in society).
153. See Melilli, supra note 30, at 459 (noting Batson successes are rare).
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Although it correctly applied the Batson test twice,15 4 the Mine-
tos court faced the unenviable position of choosing between re-
warding a party it found discriminated against jurors by
granting a new trial or not addressing the injury to the ex-
cluded jurors at all. While the appropriate application of Bat-
son's three-step test kept this plaintiff from being rewarded for
practicing discrimination, the opposing parties, equally guilty
of violating Batson, 55 received no sanction whatsoever. More
significantly, several jurors lost the opportunity to serve on the
Minetos jury for discriminatory reasons, and the court was un-
able to prevent or remedy this injury. While the Minetos court
could have prevented this result by recalling all of the excluded
jurors at the time the parties raised the original Batson chal-
lenges,15 6 appellate courts examining Batson challenges on ap-
peal do not have the option of preventing the injury to the ex-
cluded juror 57 because the trial is already over and the juror
has been excluded and injured. Jurors continue to be excluded
for discriminatory reasons, and Batson, as currently applied,
provides little hope of preventing this injury.
3. Purkett: A Weaker Test and Weaker Protection
The Minetos court also implicitly acknowledged that when
the Supreme Court ostensibly reaffirmed Batson in Purkett, it
left unaddressed most of the problems Batson created. Except
for noting that it would likely increase problems in applying
Batson, however, the Minetos court effectively sidestepped
Purkett. Had it applied Batson as re-articulated in Purkett, the
Minetos court could have demonstrated the potential for that
decision to increase lower court confusion in the application of
Batson.
The Purkett Court correctly recognized that lower courts
frequently collapse the second and third steps of the Batson
test and may have sought to strengthen it by reiterating the
need for third-step analysis.'58 Yet, lessening the burden on
154. See supra notes 120-128 and accompanying text (reviewing the Mine-
tos court's application of Batson).
155. Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 179-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80 (noting that trial courts
have the option of recalling excluded jurors or starting the selection process
over).
157. See supra text accompanying note 81 (noting that the remedy for Bat-
son violations uncovered at the appellate level is reversal and a new trial).
158. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam).
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the party rebutting the prima facie case of discrimination 59
provides no guidance to lower courts on the issue whether the
proffered neutral explanation is pretext. Given the demon-
strated inability of lower courts to properly apply the third step
of Batson,160 it is likely that lower courts will continue to
struggle with the same confusion and frustration that preceded
the decision,161 resulting in persistent discrimination, violating
the equal protection rights of both the litigants and prospective
jurors.
Purkett also frustrates the specific intent of Batson to pro-
tect prospective jurors. As noted, courts routinely collapse the
second and third steps of the Batson test.1 62 Despite the
Court's admonition to proceed to the third step of the Batson
analysis, lower courts may well read Purkett as allowing non-
sensical explanations to rebut prima facie cases of discrimina-
tion as long as that explanation is neutral on its face. 163 This is
particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's demonstrated
application of Batson, in which it sidestepped the third step.16
As the Minetos court realized, this type of analysis threatens to
deny both litigants and potential jurors all protection.
B. THE MINETOS COURT ERRED IN NOT EXAMINING POTENTIAL
BENEFITS OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Despite the Minetos court's pioneering role in calling for
the abolition of the peremptory challenge, 165 the approach the
court took has shortcomings that weaken its potential impact.
159. See supra text accompanying note 105 (noting the Purkett Court's
rearticulation of Batson's step two). Compare supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text (noting that Batson states there must be a relationship between the
neutral explanation and the circumstances of the trial), with supra note 106
and accompanying text (noting that the Purkett Court denied that this was a
requirement under Batson in rebutting the dissent's accusation that they
changed the law).
160. See supra text accompanying note 77 (discussing the expertise of at-
torneys at providing facially neutral explanations); supra note 93 (discussing
the difficulty judges have in discerning pretextual explanations); supra note
99 (discussing the inconsistent results of applying Batson's step three).
161. This is the point the Minetos decision sought to make. Minetos v. City
University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
162. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam)
(noting the lower court erred in collapsing the second and third Batson steps).
163. See supra notes 113-117 (noting the diverse reactions to and interpre-
tations of Purkett).
164. See supra note 91 (critiquing the Court's Hernandez analysis).
165. Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 183-84.
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The court rested its decision on the failure of the Batson test to
unmask all instances of invidious discrimination,'66 concluding
that peremptory challenges necessarily violate equal protec-
tion.1 67 The Minetos court could have reached the same result
without such a declaration. In making this broad assertion,
the court failed to take account of the fact that not all peremp-
tory challenges are based on impermissible classifications. 161
Had it examined the potential interests in retention of peremp-
tory challenges, the Minetos court could have shown that the
arguments in favor of retention are greatly outweighed by the
antidiscrimination principles the peremptory challenge cases
promote.
1. The Pretext Problem
Proponents of retention correctly point out that not every
characteristic used to justify a peremptory challenge implicates
an impermissible classification. 169 The existence of such char-
acteristics seriously undermines the Minetos court's holding
that peremptory challenges per se violate equal protection. For
example, if a plaintiff teacher uses a peremptory challenge to
exclude a school administrator in an employment discrimina-
tion case, it is likely a reasonable challenge. Many allowed
characteristics, however, overlap the classifications Batson and
its progeny identify as impermissible for use in excluding po-
tential jurors.17 The school administrator might also be African
American or female. The overlap allows permissible character-
istics to serve as pretexts for masking prohibited discrimination
because attorneys can easily sidestep the requirements of Bat-
son by citing such characteristics as neutral explanations.171
166. See supra notes 129-139 and accompanying text (discussing the Mine-
tos decision's reasoning and conclusions).
167. See Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
168. See supra note 93 (noting that impermissible motives such as race
and gender coexist with all of the legal reasons for using peremptory chal-
lenges).
169. See supra note 93 (noting that not all peremptory challenges are
based on impermissible classifications).
170. See supra note 93 (noting the overlap between permissible and im-
permissible classifications in making peremptory challenges).
171. See supra note 75 (noting attorney expertise at developing neutral
explanations); supra note 93 (discussing the ease of attorneys sidestepping
Batson).
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The third step of Batson is meant to unmask such pretexts. 17 2
As noted, however, the test provides no guidance on how lower
courts should approach this analysis, 17 3 producing inconsistent
and unpredictable results.'74 Further, as the Minetos court
pointed out, attempts to aid courts in identifying those expla-
nations that should be presumed pretextual instead provide at-
torneys with a guide to masking discriminatory animus.75 The
inconsistent protection of the rights of litigants and jurors as
well as the open invitation to attorneys to deliberately or un-
consciously corrupt the judicial process strongly cuts against
retention of the peremptory challenge, even considering that
not all peremptory challenges are discriminatory. The Minetos
court could have argued that its ban is a better solution to
eradicating discrimination than relying on courts to second
guess potentially pretextual explanations.
2. The Fallacy of an Impartial Jury: The Interest in Retention
Proponents of retention also argue that the peremptory
challenge is a necessary component of the jury trial system be-
cause it ensures impaneling an impartial jury, guaranteed un-
der the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has in fact
stated that ensuring an impartial jury is the sole purpose of
the peremptory challenge. 76 Yet, supporters of retention pro-
vide no empirical evidence that peremptory challenges indeed
172. See supra text accompanying note 77 (discussing the third step of the
Batson analysis).
173. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Batson's lack of
guidelines to lower courts).
174. See supra notes 93 (discussing inconsistent application of Batson); su-
pra note 99 (discussing lack of consistency in applying Batson). In the exam-
ple given, one of two results could occur. The attorney might state that the
reason for the peremptory challenge is the job held by the administrator.
Applying Batson, the court could conclude that this reason is not pretextual
when the job is held by the administrator, or that it is pretextual when it is
not. Either of these results frustrates the intent of Batson to unmask and
prevent invidious discrimination. In the first instance, a juror is excluded for
discriminatory reasons. In the second, there is no invidious discrimination to
uncover, but the challenging party is punished anyway.
175. See Minetos v. City University of New York, 925, F. Supp. 177, 184-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that guidelines for evaluating neutral explanations
serve as a guide to defeating a Batson challenge); supra note 93 (noting that
certain explanations are presumed to be pretextual in some jurisdictions but
unimpeachable in others).
176. See supra note 30 (noting that the sole purpose of the peremptory
challenge is seating an impartial jury).
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ensure or are necessary for seating an impartial jury.17 7 Fur-
ther, even the most vehement supporters of the peremptory
challenge admit that it is the appearance or perception of an
impartial jury that peremptory challenges preserve. 178 The Su-
preme Court has explicitly stated that eliminating discrimina-
tion from the courtroom is more important than a mere percep-
tion or appearance of impartiality.17 9 Allowing the challenges
may also create the perception of a partial jury when the attor-
ney utilizes peremptory challenges to strike minorities for dis-
criminatory reasons and the court fails to detect the discrimi-
nation. There is no constitutional right to a partial jury.' In
a straightforward balancing of these interests, any de minimus
interest in apparent or perceived impartiality fails to support
retention of peremptory challenges in light of the discrimina-
tion they perpetuate.
C. BANNING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: A SOUND SOLUTION
TO DISCRIMINATION
Despite the failure of the Minetos court to sufficiently sup-
port its holding that peremptory challenges per se violate equal
protection, the ban it proposes is a sound solution to the dis-
crimination problems peremptory challenges perpetuate. The
Minetos court could have further supported their proposed ban
by showing that alternative solutions fail to provide the consis-
tent, predictable protection for litigants, jurors, and the com-
munity that Batson and its progeny sought. Inclusion of such a
discussion would have diminished susceptibility to arguments
that Batson simply needs to be retooled to preserve rather than
abolish peremptory challenges. Further support for banning
peremptory challenges could have been found in noting the
strong public policy advantage found in completely eliminating
discrimination from jury selection.
177. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (presenting one argument
that there are reasons to believe that peremptory challenges undermine fair
trials, and the counterargument that peremptory challenges ensure impartial
juries).
178. See supra note 30 (noting that attorneys seek to strike jurors per-
ceived as biased); supra note 89 (noting that the Edmonson Court referred to
a "perception of a fair jury," not an impartial jury).
179. See supra note 89 (noting that the Court favors elimination of dis-
crimination over a perception of an impartial jury).
180. Melilli, supra note 30, at 503.
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1. Other Solutions Fail to Protect Litigants and Jurors from
Victimization in the Courtroom
The Supreme Court intended that Batson and its progeny
eradicate discriminatory jury selection processes."l ' Prevent-
ing such victimization in the courtroom requires a solution that
consistently protects every litigant and potential juror from
discrimination. Those attempting to reconcile peremptory
challenges with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause
sometimes propose alternatives to an absolute ban.18 2 None of
the proposed solutions, however, provide protection for liti-
gants and potential jurors that is as reliable and predictable as
the ban proposed by the Minetos court.
One proposed solution is to allow the legislature to statu-
torily define those classifications and characteristics that are
impermissible as bases for peremptory challenges.183 This so-
lution, however, still leaves courts in the position of determin-
ing when violations occur. The problem of pretext is com-
pletely unaddressed. Under such a scheme, courts remain in
the untenable and unworkable position of second-guessing the
attorney's motives for making a challenge. Moreover, appeals
courts are still unable to remedy the injuries to improperly ex-
cluded jurors.1
Affirmative jury selection is a second proposed solution.
This a process in which attorneys submit a list of the jurors
they desire to the judge after voir dire.18 The judge first
chooses the jurors on both lists, then alternates between the
two lists until the entire jury is seated.186 Affirmative jury se-
lection may well result in juries that both sides find acceptable
and impartial, either in fact or appearance. These techniques,
however, fail to prevent attorneys from making their selections
based on impermissible classifications because the attorney
may refuse to include jurors on his list for discriminatory rea-
18L See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing the pur-
poses of Batson and its progeny).
182. See supra notes 65-66 (discussing proposed solutions to the Batson
dilemma without abolishing peremptory challenges).
183. Babcock, supra note 18, at 1174-79.
184. See supra text accompanying note 81 (noting the appellate court rem-
edy for Batson violations); see also supra notes 155-157 and accompanying
text (noting the inability of the Minetos and appellate courts to remedy the
injury to the excluded jurors)
185. See supra note 65 (discussing proposed solutions to Batson problems
without abolishing peremptory challenges).
186. See supra note 66 (discussing affirmative selection techniques).
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sons. Further, because the actual decisions as to which jurors
the attorney chooses are hidden from view, there is no way to
know that such discrimination has occurred.
Another proposed alternative is decreasing the number of
peremptory challenges allowed.18 7 While this alternative might
decrease the ability of attorneys to remove all members of a
protected class, this alternative does not ultimately address
the discriminatory use of the remaining peremptory chal-
lenges. Expanding the jury pool to include a greater number of
jurors in "protected" classes'8 8 would have a similar effect. In
addition, it would increase the number of jurors potentially ex-
posed to discriminatory exclusion. Consequently, a complete
ban on the use of peremptory challenges is the only option that
consistently protects both the litigant and the juror.
2. Ban Provides for Public Confidence and a
Nondiscriminatory Jury System
The Supreme Court based the holdings of Batson and its
progeny in part on the need to maintain public confidence in
the jury system. 18 9 The Minetos court's argument for banning
peremptory challenges would have been stronger had it noted
the benefit to the community in providing a jury selection sys-
tem that unquestionably prohibits discrimination. The demon-
strated inability of courts to eliminate discrimination in jury
selection under the current law undermines public confidence
because the jury's neutrality and ability to render a fair verdict
is called into question. 9 ' Increased media attention to jury
selection processes and composition and the relationship of
these factors to verdicts exposes the justice system to great
scrutiny and criticism. 9' Past public perceptions of discrimi-
natory jury selection and resulting jury bias has had tragic
consequences. 192  Because nondiscriminatory jury selection
communicates to the public an understanding that a chosen
187. See supra note 65 (discussing proposed solutions to Batson problems).
188. See supra note 65 (discussing alternatives to the abolition of peremp-
tory challenges).
189. See supra note 84 (noting the Batson purpose in protecting the com-
munity).
190. See supra note 84 (discussing the effect of discriminatory jury selec-
tion processes on public perceptions of the justice system).
191. See supra note 84 (discussing the increase in media attention to jury
selection processes).
192. See supra note 84 (discussing the impact perceptions of biased juries
has had in past cases).
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jury is unbiased and validates the jury's verdict in the public
mind,193 increased public scrutiny supports the elimination of
the peremptory challenge.
CONCLUSION
Despite years of precedent in which the Supreme Court
protected the peremptory challenge, the Minetos court boldly
ruled that they are a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and called for a complete ban. The Minetos court cor-
rectly exposed the shortcomings of Batson as an unworkable
standard. Although the Minetos court's reasoning was incom-
plete, its solution to the problem of discriminatory jury selec-
tion techniques is sound. Banning the peremptory challenge
provides results more predictable and consistent with the an-
tidiscrimination principles of Batson and its progeny than does
the current test because it most consistently protects the liti-
gant and the prospective juror. Eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges is also desirable for maintenance of public confidence in
the jury system. Future courts should reexamine the peremp-
tory challenge system and join the Minetos clarion call for abo-
lition of the peremptory challenge.
193. See supra note 84 (discussing the importance of jury selection in vali-
dating the jury's verdict).
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